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PRESUMPTIVE REASONING APPLIED TO
LEGAL DOCTRINE
PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDENS OF PROOF
AS TOOLS FOR LEGAL STABILITY AND

CHANGE
TAMAER FRANKEL*

INTRODUCTION

Presumptions and burdens of proof are used, among other
purposes, to maintain legal stability and at the same time effect
change. By imposing the burden of proof on the party asserting a
certain outcome, courts can calibrate burdens of proof and substantive rules until experience points to rule retention or amendment. As agents of change, presumptions and burdens of proof
are far more flexible and less brittle than rules.'
This Article tells the story of presumptions and burdens of
proof in litigation between corporate shareholders and managements. This litigation is replete with volatile presumptions and
innovative burdens of proof, demonstrating their effectiveness
and flexibility as tools for legal stability and change. This litigation also demonstrates their limits as tools for change: excessive,
varied, and undisciplined use can bring chaos. Because burdens*
of proof relate to particular facts, constant changes can create
too many fact-specific results that defy generalization. More importantly, presumptions impose obligations to respond; burdens
of proof constitute the responses. As the courts alter the facts
that a party must prove to win, but not the presumptions to
* Professor of Law, Boston University Law School. My thanks to Professor Eric Green
for his insightful comments on this article and to Mark Kornfeld, David Petti, and George
Attisano for their committed and meticulous research.
1. Both a rule on the one hand and a presumption and burden of proof on the other
hand affect the outcome of a litigation. Yet they differ a rule defines what a plaintiff must
prove to win his case and what the defendant must prove to defend against liability, presumptions and burdens of proof determine which party (plaintiff or defendant) can take
advantage of a presumption of certain facts, and which party must bear the burden of
proving certain facts. Courts do not change rules during a litigation; they do change
presumptions and burdens of proof from party to party during the litigation.
Thus, a rule might hold that, for the plaintiff to win, facts 1, 2, and 3 must be proved.
Throughout the trial the rule does not change. However, a court may grant the plaintiff
the advantage of presumption of fact 2, and impose on the defendant the burden of
negating it. During the litigation a court may allow the defendant to take advantage of a
presumption that negates fact 2, and impose on the plaintiff the burden of proving it.
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which the facts respond, the connections between the presumptions and burdens of proof loosen and disintegrate. With no internal relationship, these presumptions and burdens make little
sense and provide little future guidance.
Four presumptions are fundamental to this Article, and all
four appear in corporate shareholder-management litigation.
They are: (i) experience-based presumptions, for example, the
presumption that in financial matters, most people will act in
their own self-interest rather than in the interest of others; (ii)
tradition-based presumptions, for example, that people will follow the trodden path,2 which underlies the rule that directors
must properly inform themselves and deliberate before making
decisions; (iii) presumptions of legality, legitimacy, and orderliness, for example, that corporate directors were legally elected,
and that fiduciaries hold and manage other peoples' money in
accordance with the law;' and (iv) initial presumptions in favor
of defendants. 4 The set of facts that plaintiffs must prove to win is
determined by the initial burden of proof, which in turn varies
depending on individual causes of action. In every case, however,
plaintiffs must satisfy a burden of proof, however slight.
This Article begins with a discussion of corporate management's duties, then moves to an exposition of presumptions and
burdens of proof in shareholder-management litigations, and
concludes with an examination of takeover litigation in which
changing burdens of proof have rendered the substantive law
practically incoherent.

2. Habits, traditions, and customs, as well as experience-based presumptions arc related to our limited attentive capacity. It is important for us to focus our attention on new
events because the unfamiliar may be more risky than the status quo. We often put ourselves on an "automatic pilot" as to what we repeatedly do in order to have free attention
to the new and unexpected. See WiLLLAM M. BEsr, A TRr.xnsE oN Parsurn.rlOS OF LAW
AND FAcr § 47, 115 (reprint. 1981)(1845).
3. This presumption allows people to plan and rely on what seens to be the case without
further investigation. Such a presumption also increases the security and the value of
legal rights to property, and freedom from intervention by others, whether individuals or
organizations or government. A stable society must provide its members with rules that
assure them of their ownership, and freedom, rights and duties.
4. Initial presumptions support stability, and may, in many cases, be inevitable. See infra
section HA
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I.

CORPORATE MANAGEMENT'S DUTIES

A.

The Prohibitions

Most litigation between shareholders and management involves management's fiduciary duties in exercising the powers
entrusted to them by virtue of their office.' As fiduciaries, it is
management's duty both to make informed and deliberate decisions (duty of care).6 Management must exercise its powers exclusively or primarily in keeping with the purposes for which the
powers were given: to benefit the corporation and its sharehold-

ers. Therefore, corporate management may not enter the corporation into transactions in which management is self-interested
(duty of loyalty).7

B.

The Exception

These prohibitions do not apply if the person to whom the
fiduciary owes his duties, the entrustor, consents to an improper

transaction.' Such consent temporarily abrogates the entrustor's
right to rely on the fiduciary, leaving the entrustor to fend for
himself. To release the fiduciary of his duties, the entrustor's
consent must be informed, to a great extent by the fiduciary, as
well as independently of the fiduciary. That is, the entrustor must
be on notice that he cannot rely on his fiduciary with respect to
the particular transaction.9 The prohibitions and the exception
together form the basis of the relationship between management
on the one hand, and the corporation and its shareholders on

the other hand.
5. See generally, Tamar Frankel, Fidudary Law, 71 CGA..L. R v. 795 (1983).
6. Statutes and case law say that directors and officers owe their corporations a duty of
care: they must exercise that degree of skill, diligence, and care that a reasonably prudent
person would exercise in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d
Cir. 1982); AMERUcAN LAW INsrrruTE, PRiNCIPLEs oF CoRPoRATE GovERNANCE: ANALYIs
AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 2.01, 4.01 (Proposed Final Draft, March 31, 1992). See also RoBERT C. CLARK, CoRpoRAT LAW § 3.4 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980); Sinclair Oil Co. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); ALI, supranote 6, at §§ 5.01-5.08. See also CLARK at 141.
8. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976); ALI, supra note 6, at
§ 5.02(a) (2) (D). See also CLARK at 248.
9. Arguably, there are limits to this exception based upon public policy. This discussion
excludes the issue of a broad future "blank check" consent before the fact. These limits
can be overlooked without doing injustice to the discussion.
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PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDENS OF PROOF IN SHAREHOLDERSCORPoRATE FIDucIAIES LITIGATION

A.

InitialPresumption and Presumption of Legality

At the initial stage of the litigation, plaintiff-shareholders bear
the burden of proving that defendant-corporate fiduciaries violated their duties to the corporation and its shareholders. Fiduciaries enjoy the shelter of a presumption of legality. In carrying
out their responsibilities, for example, there is a presumption
that they satisfied their duties of care and loyalty.
The imposition of the burden of proof on the plaintiff further
entrenches the status quo, the existing balance of power and
state of affairs between the two parties, which the plaintiff seeks
to alter through a court order. Support of the status quo is arguably justice-neutral, strengthening the existing state of affairs regardless of how intrinsically just it is, and without regard to the
manner by which it was achieved. This initial presumption in
favor of the status quo can serve to protect corporate management that acted legally, as well as those who acted illegally. A
rejoinder to this possible criticism is that, as a matter of principle, it is preferable to err on the side of pardoning the culpable
rather than sanctioning the innocent. As such, the presumption
of legality also serves to strengthen the status quo.
The imposition of initial burdens on the plaintiff can be attacked as inefficient because the burden is not necessarily imposed on the party possessing the relevant information.
Arguably, corporate management possesses such information
about the flaws in its decisions. As we shall see, management may
have to bear a burden of proving some of these facts, but the
initial burden of proof does not seem to account for this imperfect distribution of information.1 0 Instead, it seems that courts
use burdens of proof to induce parties to provide information,
starting usually with plaintiffs." Arguably, placing the initial bur10. In addition, rules of procedure assist the party bearing the burden of proof to
ferret out information from the other party, subject to limits.
11. See 3A Wiuw M. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORAIONS § 1340.20 (rev. ed. 1994) ("In
actions by shareholders on the corporation's behalf, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff."). Charles McCormick had this to say.
In most cases, the party who has the burden of pleading a fact will have the
burden of producing evidence.... The burden of pleading and proof with regard to most facts has been and should be assigned to the plaintiff who generally
seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore naturally should
be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.
CHARLES C. McCoRaaIC, 2 McCoRmICiK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (4th ed. 1992)
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den on shareholder-plaintiffs violates the principle of equality of
the parties before the law. In this vein, each party should be
given the opportunity to prove his case, and the party offering
the most cogent presentation should prevail. One possible response to this argument is that parties are indeed treated equally,
in that all plaintiffs bear the initial burden of proof. The rebuttal
would be that some people in positions of power, such as corporate management, are typically the defendants in such actions,
while people subject to the exercise of private power, such as
small investors, are often the plaintiffs. Thus, the burdens imposed on certain classes of people who fill certain roles may still
remain inequitable.
The primary response to arguments against the initial burden
of proof is that regardless of whether it is efficient or fair, the
burden of proof is inevitable; it is likely to result even from an
equality-based burden of proof system in which both parties start
on equal footing-"the state of nature." The plaintiffs' burden of
proof will inevitably evolve to eliminate arguments and evidence
that have been repeatedly accepted over a long period of time.
Judges are likely to require further proof where plaintiffs' assertions are contrary to the status quo, rather than from defendants
(who demand nothing and assert nothing).12 Over time, plain13
tiffs will be required to bear the initial burden of proof.
Although the "state of nature" inevitably will result in the
plaintiff bearing the initial burden of proof, the specific facts that
the plaintiff must prove are not preordained but depend on the
plaintiff's cause of action, that is, the facts that it must prove to
make its case. These initial facts are also affected by the experienced-based, habit-based presumptions, or social stability-based
presumptions that work in the plaintiff's favor. If plaintiffs rely
on these presumptions, a conflict among the presumptions
arises: at the initial stage of the trial, plaintiffs would be required
to prove facts that they could rely upon without proof in later
stages. In such cases the winning presumption is not constant;
thus courts' decisions can go either way.14 Inevitably, however,
12. See generally B.sr, supra note 2, at 57.
13. Arguably, but for the presumption, management should have to prove that it was
legally elected. However, plaintiffs generally do not attack the legitimacy of management's elections, but rather particular transactions. If nothing is proved as to that transaction, management can prevail, since management itself would never bring the case. The

"state of nature" leads to presumptions that support the status quo.
14. For example, in criminal cases, the state has the burden of proving that the accused
violated the law. Whether the state must also prove that the accused was competent to
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the plaintiff must start with some proof. If neither party proves
anything, the defendant wins."5
B.

The BusinessJudgment Rule

Plaintiff-shareholders in corporate litigation not only bear the
burden of initial proof but also confront a gate-keeper rule limiting the facts that they are allowed to prove at the outset. Plaintiffs
may not attack the merits of the corporate boards' decisions subject to complaint, and courts will not scrutinize these merits at
the outset. 6 Plaintiffs must first meet their burden of proving
that the board's decision was flawed in one of two ways.
One flaw is that the board's decisions were not informed and
deliberate, essentially not in keeping with the duty of care." This
proof is grounded in an experience-based presumption that
good decisions are made on the basis of adequate information
and after considered deliberation.
The flaw that plaintiffs may prove in the alternative is that the
decisionmakers had personal interests in the outcome of the destand trial or had capacity to commit the crime depends on the weight that the courts will
give to the experience-based presumption that most people above a certain age are competent and have capacity.
In unique situations there may be no status quo. After the Second World War
thousands of survivors of the Holocaust came to Israel and sought to prove ownership of
land that their distant relatives owned. All these relatives died in concentration camps,
and the question often arose of who died first. If a husband dies before the wife, his
family would inherit, and vice versa. No presumption could accommodate the Holocaust
(e.g., distinguishing between young and old, men and women). Israel chose to follow an
international convention adopting the presumption that both spouses died
simultaneously.
15. The "state of nature" is likely to produce experience-based presumptions. Asjudges
accept assertions based on experience, the burden of proof will be placed on the party
that makes unusual assertions. Similarly, "the state of nature" will result in the adoption of
habit-based presumptions-customary and traditional, or socially stable states of affairsin favor of orderly social conduct and behavior that is honest, legal, and legitimate.
16. See 5 FLETcHER, supra note 11, at § 2104. Fletcher states:
[w~here as customary, the management and control of a corporation is vested by
a statute or a charter, not in the stockholder or management, their actions in
regard to the affairs of the corporation are controlling and exclusive, and the
stockholder or member cannot control the directors or trustees in the exercise
of the judgment invested in them by the charter. Their function is to exercise
judgment and discretion that the courts cannot do in their stead, and so long as
the directors of the corporation control its affairs within the limits of the law,
matters of business judgment and discretion relating to internal matters are not
subject to judicial review.
Id.
17. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (NJ., 1981). See also
CLAx, supranote 6, at 123.
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cisions. 8 This proof will raise an experience-based presumption
that corporate fiduciaries, like all fiduciaries who have a personal
stake in the outcome of their decisions and who act both for the
corporation and for themselves, will pursue their own interests
rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders. The
previous presumption is coupled with a second presumption that
management's self-interested decisions will not benefit, and
might even harm, the corporation and its shareholders.
If plaintiff-shareholders fail to prove that the board's decision
was flawed by lack of care or tainted with conflicts of interest,
their actions will be unsuccessful. If plaintiffs prove either flaw,
the burden of proof then shifts to the defendants. At this point
the gate opens up, allowing judicial scrutiny of the merits of the
decision.
C.

The Entrustor'sConsent

The defendants have the burden of proving their defenses.
One defense available to all fiduciaries is that their entrustors
consented to the careless or self-interested transaction. The presumption underlying this defense is that the protections of fiduciary law are unnecessary when the party whose interest the law is
designed to protect-the entrustor-has consented to his fiduciary's flawed decision. The entrustor should be the judge of what
is in his own best interest. When he gives consent to a transaction
that is tainted by self-interest or carelessness, this is evidence that
the entrustorjudged the transactions to be in his interest. 19 The
entrustor's consent impliedly negates the presumption that the
fiduciary's decisions that were reached by flawed process or that
were in conflict failed to benefit or even harmed the entrustor.
The fact that the transaction benefitted the fiduciary becomes
irrelevant.
18. The basic idea of the fraud and conflict of interest exceptions is that, when directors are shown to have been trying to further their own personal ends, or have been
strongly tempted to bias the terms of the transaction in their own interest, their judgments are not really within the class of discretionary exercises of power on behalf of the
corporation that we want to protect. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984) ("[D]irectors can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive
any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing as opposed to a benefit
which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally."). See also CLARY, supra
note 6, at 124.
19. Almost one hundred and fifty years ago the courts established a presumption that
people will accept what is for their benefit. See BEsr, supra note 2, at 148.
Similarly, if people destroy evidence, the presumption is that the evidence destroyed
was against their interests. Id. at 128.
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To be legally effective, the entrustor's consent must meet a
number of conditions. The entrustor must be on clear notice
that he can no longer rely on the fiduciary; in essence he must be
independent of the fiduciary. To be capable of giving intelligent
consent, the entrustor must have certain information that is typically provided by the fiduciary.2 0 The defendant fiduciaries bear
the burden of proving that the consent satisfied these conditions
and was thus valid.
D.

Shareholders' Representatives-The Courts and Intra-Corporate
Groups: IncreasedJudicialRole and Consequent Rule
Change

Historically, only entrustors or persons they designated to act
on their behalf could consent to flawed transactions. The courts
refused to uphold such flawed transactions, and they were voidable by the entrustors-shareholders. 2 ' Over time, however, the
courts began to approve transactions tainted by conflict of interest on the part of corporate fiduciaries, even if not all shareholders had approved such transactions. Furthermore, the courts and
the statutes recognized intra-corporate groups' authority to consent to flawed transactions on behalf of the corporation and its
shareholders.

22

The substitution of the courts and intra-corporate representative-fiduciaries, for individual, consenting entrustors required
change in the substantive law. When entrustors consent personally, judicial scrutiny focuses on their ability and capacity to consent. Ultimately, however, their decisions are entirely their
own-they can consent or withhold their consent for any reason
and for no reason at all. The presumption is that they will only
20. If the corporation knowingly and freely rejects an opportunity, and also consents to
the executive's taking it, there is little basis in theory for precluding the executive from
taking it. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Hayer Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 391 P.2d 979, 986
(Wash. 1964) (holding that a corporation cannot ratify the breach of fiduciary duties unless full and complete disclosure of all facts and circumstances is made by the fiduciary
and an intentional relinquishment of the corporation of its rights); Globe Wooler Co. v.
Utica Gas & Electric Co., 121 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1918) ("The trustee ... cannot rid
himself of the duty to warn and to denounce."). See also CLAax, supra note 6, at 248.
21. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Are DirectorsTrustees? Conflicts ofInterest and CorporateMorality,
22 Bus. LAw. 35 (1966). This rule is still in effect under the law governing the fiduciary
relationships of trust and agency.
22. See CLARK, supranote 6, at 248 ("[M]odern corporate statutes allow the board to
delegate.. its functions to working committees."). See alsoMarsh, supra note 21, at 48-51.
For a discussion of the sorts of guidelines courts set in reviewing a dismissal of a derivative
suit by a special litigation committee, see Zapata v. Maldinado, 430 A.2d 779, 787-789 (Del.
1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
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consent if the arrangement is in their best interests, which is the
result the law favors. 3 Thus, entrustor-shareholders may act arbitrarily in granting consent. When courts or entrustor-representaives approve a flawed transaction, however, a need for standards
arises, and this is turn requires changes in the substantive law. As
we shall see, these changes have become varied and numerous
with their links to the fundamental presumption (regarding
flawed fiduciary decisions) becoming increasingly tenuous.
The fundamental presumption is twofold: that fiduciaries
faced with a conflict of interest will prefer their own interest to
that of entrustors; and that such self-interested transactions will
certainly not benefit the entrustors and may in fact prove harmful to them. In exercising their power to approve flawed transactions, the courts require corporate management to rebut the
second, more objective prong of the presumption. 4 The more
subjective first prong remains irrebuttable. Corporate management fiduciaries who engage in self-interested transactions bear
the burden of proving that the transaction is fair to the corporation and its shareholders.2 5 These developments in the substantive law afford corporate fiduciaries not only the defense that all
the shareholders consented to the flawed transactions, but also
the defense that the decisions in question were fair to the corporation or the shareholders, regardless of whether the shareholders agreed to them. If the directors can prove the transaction was
fundementally fair, they will prevail.
E. DisinterestedDirectors
The legal concept of disinterested directors became accepted
in the mid-1970s, 26 and they were recognized as shareholder-representatives. This recognition required changes in the law and
the courts' role. In addition to satisfying the preconditions for
entrustors' consent, these representatives of entrustors' interests
are subject to presumptions applicable to any fiduciary. As such,
23. See, e.g., McKee v. Interstate Oil & Gas, 188 P. 109, 112 (Ok. 1920), cert. denied 258
U.S. 632 (1921) (holding that a corporation may acquire property as a result of a tainted
transaction consented to by the shareholders when the corporation used the propoerty
for the benefit of the corporation); See also Eastern Oklahoma Television Co., Inc. v.
Ameco, Inc., 437 F.2d 138, 142 (Ok. 1971); CLARY, supranote 6, at 248.
24. Id.
25. Unfair transactions can be defined as transactions that reduce entrustors' benefits
harm the entrustors, although the two might not be distinct. Benefit to disloyal fiduciaries
may imply reduced benefits or harm to the entrustors.
26. See generally CLARY, supra note 6, at 645.
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the consent of these representatives must be authorized, informed, deliberate, free of conflict of interest, 27 and independent of the interested corporate fiduciaries. If the defendantmanagement can prove that the disinterested directors' consent
met these conditions, the courts will view their consent as binding on the entrustors. Thus, courts will not scrutinize either the
consent or the transaction subject to the consent on the merits.
With the advent of the disinterested director doctrine, defendant-management was afforded the protection of the business
judgment rule anytime the disinterested directors gave binding
consent to flawed transactions.
The presumption that disinterested directors' decisions are
not tainted by conflict of interest, and that these directors are
capable of fairly representing the corporation and its shareholders in granting consent, is not entirely experience-based; there
were, in- fact, manifold indications to the contrary.28 As doubts
about the disinterestedness of these directors grew, new intracorporate entities of shareholder-representatives emerged. One
example is the proliferation of new litigation committees to evaluate the justification of shareholder derivative suits. 29 However,
some courts expressed skepticism with respect to the disinterestedness of these committees as well."0
As doubts about disinterested directors or litigation committees grew, a new round of judicial supervision of disinterested
directors' decisions has emerged. This supervision was intro27. The likelihood that the shareholders will reach decisions that are harmful to themselves is far smaller than the likelihood that their representatives' decisions will fail to
maximize the shareholders' interests.
28. Disinterested directors are chosen by the interested directors. Most are members of
the same class and share the same opinions, political views, experiences and feelings
about shareholders' suits. Disinterested directors are busy, with far greater commitments
to other enterprises. Generally, they support management or resign.
Yet, disinterested directors have reputations to protect and resignation may amount to
a confession of defeat, or retreat from battle. These directors operate in the shadows of
personal and internal conflicts, a shade removed from the direct financial conflicts of
interest involved in the transactions they are expected to scrutinize objectively without
bias.
29. The committees were usually composed of directors who did not serve on the
board at the time of the alleged violations.
30. SeeJoy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). That opinion stated:
[T]he special litigation committees created to evaluate the merits of certain litigation are appointed by the defendants to that litigation. It is not cynical to
expect that such committees will tend to view derivative suits against the directors with skepticism... The conflict of interest which renders the business judgment rule inapplicable in the case of directors who are the defendants is hardly
eliminated by the creation of a special litigation committee.
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duced by changing burdens of proof. Disinterested directors' approval of conflict of interest transactions no longer is viewed as
equivalent to that of the entrustor-shareholders. 3 1 However, the
courts have refrained from imposing on defendants the same
burden of proving transactional fairness as is imposed on the defendants in "strong" conflicts transactions. Instead, the courts
shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiffs to prove a different
set of facts. 32 For example, plaintiffs are required to prove that
the disinterested directors' decision-process was flawed, and also
that the directors lacked reasonable bases for their conclusions.3 3
The "reasonable bases" objective prong of the burden provides a
opening through which the courts- could scrutinize the merits of
the decision under attack.
F. Disinterested Shareholders
Another intra-corporate group authorized to give consent to
transactions tainted by conflict of interest is the majority of the
disinterested shareholders. According to an experience-based
presumption, however, these shareholders should either rationally decline to give consent or give their consent without much
attention to available information or the merits of the decisions.
This is so because the cost of providing informed consent to
these shareholders outweighs the value of these shareholders'
stake in the corporation.3 4 The basis of the presumption on
which the defendant-management's defense of consent rule rests
is thus substantially weakened.
In response, the courts have modified the rule and shifted the
burden of proof once again.3 5 The full defense that the entrustor-shareholder's consent protects management has been re31. See Zapata,supra note 22, at 788-89 (holding that when courts review the dismissal
of a derivative suit by a special litigation committee, the court shall place the burden of
proving independence, good faith, and reasonable investigation on the corporation.). See
also CLA.~i, supranote 6, at 646.
32. See Auerbach, supranote 22, at 648; See, e.g., Klinicki v. Lundpa, 695 P.2d 906, 91920 (Or. 1985) (holding under Oregon law that a director wishing to take advantage of a
corporate opportunity must disclose all material facts regarding the opportunity to the
disinterested directors or, if none, to the disinterested shareholders.). Note that consent
by both disinterested directors and shareholders is a wasteful repetition of the director's
previous acceptance. See CLARK, supra note 6, at 648.
33. Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About FtduciayDuty? Directors' Conflict-ofInterest Transactions and the ALl's Principlesof CorporateGovernance, 61 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray.
954, 956-57 (1993), citing AmEPacAN LAW INsTrrE, PRrNciPLcs OF CORPORATE GOVERNANcE: ANALYsis AND RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 5.02(a) (2) (B).

34. See CLA.u, supra note 6, at 648.
35. See Gottlieb v. Hayden, 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952); ALI, supra note 6, at § 7.11.
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duced to a conditional defense. Only if the transaction is
adjudged to be fair would the public shareholders' consent become a complete defense for management. If the plaintiffs can
prove that the transaction is unfair, management-defendants will
lose. Perhaps because the shareholders' consent provides a weak
presumption of fairness that favors management, the plaintiffs
must bear the burden of proving that the transaction was
36
unfair.
The story up to this point demonstrates both the legal stability
and change courts have maintained through presumptions and
burdens of proof. The third part of this Article demonstrates the
extreme permutations in presumptions and burdens of proof
that have led to incoherent law today. The following Part demonstrates what can happen when courts and legislatures use too
much of a good thing.
III.

A.

MURKY PRESUMPTIONS AND

UNSTABLE

BURDENS OF PROOF

Managements' New Powers as Shareholder-Representatives

As hostile takeovers became popular, management began to
take defensive measures against so-called raiders. The courts recognized management's power to respond to takeover attempts,
not only of the corporate action variety, for example, mergers,
but also tender offers that involve no corporate actions. The
courts viewed tender offers not only as offers to purchase shares
but also as bids for control, sometimes to the detriment of the
minority shareholders and always against management's wishes.3 8
The hostility in "hostile takeovers" is borne by management toward raiders. In most cases, tender offers are followed by a
merger of the target corporation with the raider's subsidiary.
More importantly, because numerous shareholders are incapable
of negotiating with the raiders, management is left to represent
their interests. For these reasons, responses to takeovers can be
viewed as part of the managerial function and management's authority to oversee the corporations.
There are serious arguments, however, against vesting management with power to negotiate with raiders on behalf of shareholders. The corporate actions involved in takeovers have no
36. See O'Connor, supra note 33, at 956.
37. See CI.pA, supra note 6, at 572.
38. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 993 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) Paragraph 98,063 (Del. 1994).
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business rationale except that the shareholders' sell their shares
to the raiders. Further, representing the selling shareholders,
which entails evaluating the adequacy of tender offers and assuring that the raider will treat all shareholders fairly, is not usually a
managerial function, although management is well informed
about the corporation. More importantly, management is not
neutral or disinterested, but with respect to hostile takeovers is
hostile.
B.

Managements' Conflict of Interest in Takeover Cases

Courts recognize that in defending against takeovers, management's interests may conflict with those of the shareholders.3 9
Courts have, however, established a presumption that these conflicts of interest are weak.40 Therefore, the.courts designed a different regime for hostile takeover situations than that for
stronger conflict of interest situations. This hostile takeover regime demonstrates the weaknesses and danger of excessive
change in presumptions and burdens of proof.
Like all plaintiffs, plaintiff-shareholders in takeover cases bear
the initial burden of proof that management's adoption of defensive tactics against raiders was flawed for either lack of information and deliberation, or for conflict of interest. Because the
decisions involving defensive tactics were added to the business
judgment calculus, the plaintiffs must prove at least one of the
flaws before the burden of justifying their decisions shifts to
management.
The mere fact that a raider knocks on the door is sufficient to
shift the burden of rebutting the presumption that management's weak conflicts of interest did not harm the corporation or
shareholders. However, the facts that management must prove to
rebut the presumption are different from the facts management
must prove when their decisions are tainted by personal financial
interests. 4 1 In the case of "normal" conflicts, the defendant-management must show either that the independent directors or
39. Management have an interest in its office and its prerequisites shareholders have
an interest in the highest price and best terms a raider offers. It is unlikely that the raider
would retain the current management, especially after paying a high control premium.
40. Joel Seligman, The New CorporateLaw, 59 BRooF L. Rav. 1, 12 (1993) (quoting Kors
v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136 (Del.Ch. 1960). Professor Seligman asks rhetorically. "Why isn't the
retention of corporate positions, power, or perquisites deemed a sufficient interest to
justify a duty of loyalty analysis?" Id at 12.

41. Id. at 13-14.
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other shareholder-representatives have given a binding consent
to the transaction or that the transaction was fair. The presumption that in conflict of interest situations the directors will prefer
their interests to those of the shareholders and the corporation is
not rebuttable. Only that part of the presumption that such preference would result in harm to the corporation is rebuttable by
showing binding consent or fairness to the corporation and its
shareholders.4 2 Fairness is an objective concept and thus not easy
to prove.
In "weak" takeover conflicts of interest management may similarly prove that the disinterested directors have given binding
consent to the transaction. If their valid consent cannot be
evinced, however, the defendant-management need not show
fairness but rather that they acted in good faith with the belief
that their actions were "primarily in the corporate interest."4
This test is subjective, and their belief need only be negative, as
in absence of malice." The facts requried to meet the test are
aimed at .rebutting the first prong of the fundamental presumption, that management will put its interests before those of the
entrustors. No rebuttal is required to negate the second part of
the presumption, that management's actions will reduce the corporation's benefits or do harm to them.4"
Other facts can be shown to rebut presumptions of weak conflicts, such as a showing of "reasonable grounds" to believe that
the presence of the raider posed danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness. These facts are probably aimed at rebutting the second part of the original presumption, that if the defendant's corporate policy is not maintained, the shareholders will be harmed.
A second presumption, that the directors' actions in protecting
their own policies will not harm the shareholders, regardless of
their conflicts,4 6 is also required.
Even though the courts have recognized management's authority to represent shareholders in their negotiations with the
raiders and view the authority as a business judgment, they have
oscillated in their treatment of this representation. Sometimes
courts interfered in management's decision far more than ever
before, and interfered by rules rather than by presumptions and
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id. at 13.
Id. at 13-14, n.47.
Id. at 14, n.49.
Id.
These presumptions fly in the face of numerous experiences to the contrary.
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burdens of proof.4 7 Sometimes courts adopted the business judgment rule and expanded management's powers to eliminate judicial supervision almost entirely.4" Between these two extremes,
courts introduced guides based on unarticulated presumptions
that differed from the fundamental presumption. These disparate treatments reflect different roles in which management is
cast. As Professor Joel Seligman recently demonstrated,4 9 judicial
decisions have created a growing distinction between the interests of the shareholders and those of the corporation.
When courts cast management in the role of shareholders'
representatives negotiating with raiders, the courts provide management with explicit and fairly detailed guides on what factors
to consider and how to exercise managerial authority. Many of
these guides constitute effective negotiation techniques in representing the shareholders' interests. These guides are in the form
of rules rather than presumptions and burdens of proof: the
courts simply tell management how to represent the shareholders." o These rules fly in the face of the preemption of "weak" conflicts of interest on the part of management.
When the courts characterize management's decisions as business decisions, they allow management far more leeway than
usual."1 Courts limit the extent to which management can put
obstacles in the raiders' way; defensive measures must be "reasonable in relation to the threat posed" to the shareholders and corporate "constituencies other than shareholders, such as
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally.5 2 In addition, management is allowed to represent
the corporation, its shareholders, and numerous other stakeholders.5 3 Consequently, management's authority has been vastly
expanded, while judicial supervision has been substantially reduced. Management is authorized to preclude shareholders from
selling their stock to get a better price, to maintain manage47. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 993 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) Paragraph 98,063 (Del. 1994). See also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Farber Holdings, 566 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
48. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (holding the business judgment rule applicable to takeovers).
49. See Seligman, supra note 40, at 50.
50. See generally Paramount 993 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Paragraph 98,063, and Revlon,
566 A.2d 173. See also CLAR, supranote 6, at 132-39.
51. Id.
52. See generally Unocal 493 A.2d 946, and Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984).
53. 15 Penn. Consol. Stat. § 511(d) (1), 721(e) (1993).
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ment's policies, or for the good of the other corporate
constituencies.5 4
Yet the courts have not established standards for determining
priorities among the interests of corporate constituencies, and
such standards are not easily set.55 In addition, management's
personal conflicts of interest are subsumed under conflicts between the shareholders and other stakeholders. Those conflicts
are not deemed personal conflicts of interest of management,
even though the interests of some of these stakeholders, such as
employees, are closely aligned and even identical with those of
management. Thus, as management acts to protect employees,
management also acts in its own interest without incurring the
presumption of conflicts of interest and exposing their decisions
to judicial scrutiny. Finally, when the representation of shareholders in this case is marked as a "business judgment," and disinterested directors give binding consent to the defensive tactics,
the gate-keeper rule precludes the courts from evaluating management's decisions on the merits. If no binding consent is available, the weak conflict of interest is applied, and management
must prove that it acted in good faith in the belief that its action
benefitted or did not harm the corporation. Management need
not prove that the transaction is fair to the shareholders.5 6
Courts have ruled that the defensive tactics corporate management may adopt must be reasonably related to the threat posed
by raiders. 7 This holding seems to be a rule, limiting management's actions and discretion in takeover cases. These limits are
broad because the threat includes making inadequate offers to
the shareholders and adversely impacting the corporation and its
"constituencies." 8 Thus, the balancing applies to almost all ac54. See CLIm supra note 6, at 139.
55. The Delaware courts have tried unsuccessfully to develop standards of determining
what is a proper business purpose for corporate actions and have abandoned the attempt.
See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 201 (Del. 1983).
56. See Cz.AMa,supranote 6, at 123-24.
57. Id. at 584-87.
58. This test echoes thejudicial limits on management's spending in proxy fights. Management's conflicts of interest in proxy fights and hostile takeovers are similar; in both
cases management desires to retain its position. The rationale for allowing directors to
expend corporate funds to defend their positions in a proxy fight, however, does not
apply to takeovers. In proxy fights shareholders decide for whom to vote; management
expends corporate funds to persuade shareholders in making their decision. In takeovers, defensive tactics prevent shareholders from deciding whether to sell to the raider;
management is allowed to exercise its power to limit or eliminate the shareholders' freedom to sell their shares. Further, in proxy fights, if management borrows to retain its
position, the lenders may obtain undue and hidden influence over corporate affairs. If
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dons that management takes on behalf of the shareholders and
the corporation in hostile takeovers.
The "balancing test" is puzzling because its response to the
fundamental presumption differs from the. usual response, and
the reason for the "balancing" is a presumption with a different
focus. If a raider poses a danger to the shareholders and the corporation, management should be allowed, even required, to
adopt defensive tactics that would eliminate this raider as a threat
altogether. The halfway defense, the balance, must therefore respond to something other than danger. If the requirement of
balancing is strategically necessary to extract better terms from
the raider for the corporation and its shareholders, management
is better situated to determine the extent of pressure in the particular cases. If the "reasonable relation" is designed to provide a
level playing field for management and raiders by limiting management's powers to eliminate raiders altogether, thereby encouraging some takeovers as well as the conduct of auction to
reach higher prices and better terms (in the interests of shareholders), the threat of the raider seems to be too broad because
it includes the threat to other corporate constituencies.
I suggest that the presumption underlying the "reasonable relation" is partially similar to the fundamental presumption: that
this is a conflict of interest situation in which management will
not act in the best interests of the corporation. The reasonable
relation, however, responds to a somewhat different view of management's duties: management and raiders are viewed as combatants entitled to fight fairly and squarely for the prize of corporate
control.5 9 This view seems to recognize and legitimize management's right to act in its own interest so long as the rules of combat are fair to raiders. While the fundamental presumption
seems to remain intact, the rebutting facts do not rebut the presumption because they do not rebut either the existence of conflict or possible harm to the corporation and its shareholders. All
the facts rebut is the presumption that if management were allowed to act without restraint, it would have used most or all corporate resources to win the takeover battle. The rebutting facts
merely show that the ground rules for corporate battles are fair.
the management invests its own funds to retain office, and win, it may be tempted to
recoup its investment in hidden ways. Allowing management to match the raiders' expenses makes sense as the better of these evils. These factors, however, do not exist in
hostile takeovers.
59. See CLARY, supranote 6, at 588.
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Thus, while management's conflicts in takeovers are viewed as
"weak," the courts have taken conflicting positions. Courts have
(i) increasingly interfered with management's conduct in hostile
takeover situations; (ii) extended management's powers and discretion and shielded it from scrutiny, and (iii) required rebuttal
facts that do not respond to the fundamental presumption. 0
As courts oscillate between recognizing stronger and weaker
management conflicts, between supervising management as representatives of selling shareholders and investors or the corporation and its other constituencies, courts require proof of
different facts. 6 The presumptions as to conflicts are not neces62
sarily related to the burden of proof regarding particular facts.
It seems that the links between the various burdens to fundamental presumption have been loosened or lost altogether. Without
the links confusion reigns.
CONCLUSION

The story of corporate litigation suggests that presumptions
are effective judicial tools for maintaining legal stability and
change. Courts can adhere to the rules based on underlying presumptions of certain facts, and simultaneously affect the results
in particular cases by allocating and changing the burdens of
proof regarding these facts. In addition, courts can effect legal
change by altering the presumed and rebuttal facts. There are
limits, however, to change. Because presumptions and burdens
are ground rules for court dialogue, the rebutting burdens of
proof must relate to the underlying presumptions. With continuous changes in presumptions and responsive burdens of proof,
tailored to particular situations, the link between presumed facts
and rebutting facts is likely to disintegrate. The dialogue Will thus
become incoherent. Burdens of proof might respond to facts
that are not presumed, and vice versa, resulting in parallel independent statements. In short, this Article sings the praise of
presumptions and burdens of proof as extremely useful tools for
60. Id. at 588.
61. See Seligman, supra note 40, at 14-15, citing Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55
(Del. 1964).
62. Later cases demonstrate the results. While in Paramount v. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. 1989), management was allowed to preclude shareholders from selling at $200
shares that traded at $126, in Paramount, management was not allowed to take similar
actions. The court's distinctions between these cases (for example, that the first case did
not involve transfer of control while the second case did) is not very convincing.
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stability, provided that they remain linked and embraced in the
dialogue. Excessive changes may sever the link and turn their
usefulness into confusion.

